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ABSTRACT
Executable assertions can be used to test flight control software.
However, the techniques used for testing flight software are different
from the techniques used to test other kinds of software. This is
because of the redundant nature of flight software. An experimental
setup for testing flight software using executable assertions is
described. Techniques for writing and using executable assertions to
test flight software are presented. The error detection capability of
assertions is studied and many examples of assertions are given. The
issues of placement and complexity of assertions as well as the language
features to support efficient use of assertions are also discussed.
KEYWORDS; Executable assertions, software testing, flight software,
digital flight control system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The complete software testing process involves generation of test
data, determination of expected behaviour, program execution,
observation of behaviour, and comparison of observed behaviour with the
expected behaviour. The expected behaviour is usually determined by
hand calculations, simulation, or by alternate solutions to the same
problem. The test data can be generated either randomly, exhaustively,
or by using some kind of functional or structural analysis. Software
testing techniques can either be static (peer review, walkthrough, flow
analysis, symbolic execution) or dynamic (including the use of monitors
or counters). [Adrion 82] and [Ramamoorthy 75] contain very good
surveys of software testing and automated testing tools, respectively.
Executable assertions can be used for dynamic testing of software.
An executable assertion is a logical statement about the program
variables or a block of code, such that, if there is no error during
execution, the assertion statement results in a true value. Assertions
not only serve as a good medium for documentation, but they are also
useful for testing purposes throughout the lifecycle of software. They
can be used for validation during the design phase and for exception
handling and error detection during the operation phase.
Assertions can be written by making use of either the specifications
or some property of the problem or algorithm. Assertions are usually
based either on the inverse of the problem, the range of variables, or
the relationship between variables. Some examples of assertions from
[Hecht 76] [Mahmood 83] are as follows:
(1) If the problem is to find the discrete Fourier transform of an N
point input sequence x ( j ) , then Parseval's relationship can be used
as an assertion
, k = 0 to N-1
where X(k) is the discrete Fourier transform.
(2) If the problem is to find eigenvalues of a NxN matrix then the
following must be true
i = 1 to N
where Aii are the diagonal elements and L± are the eigenvalues.
(3) The longitude calculation by a routine in flight control software
can be checked by
New_Long ^ Prev_Long + (Prev_Long - Next_Prev_Long) - K
and
New_Long ^ PrevJLong + (Prev_Long - Next_Prev_Long) + K
where K represents the threshold for the test.
Assertions have been used in program verification [Floyd 67] [Hoare
691 [Manna 69] [Luckham 75] [King 76], in program testing [Stucki 75]
[Andrews 81], and for reasonableness checks in the recovery block scheme
of software fault tolerance [Horning 74] [Randell 75] [Carter 79]. The
use of executable assertions for detecting hardware and software faults
has also been suggested in [Saib 77] [Andrews 78] [Andrews 79].
[Leveson 83] describes the use of assertions for increasing the safety
of systems. The objective of this paper is to study the use of
executable assertions for testing flight software. The error detection
capability of assertions has also been studied in [Glass 80] [Andrews
81]. However, the software used in those studies was different. Also,
this study of assertions has a different emphasis, covering all aspects
from writing of assertions to use of assertions. The paper is organized
as follows: (a) the digital flight control system used in the
experiments is discussed in Section 2, (b) Section 3 describes the
experimental setup used to write assertions and test flight software,
(c) writing of assertions and testing of flight software is explained in
Section 4, and (d) Section 5 discusses some of the language features
which would make understanding and writing assertions easier.
2 DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
The software analyzed in this experimental study is a part of a
digital flight control system, which is an integrated system that
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Fig. 1 Dual-Dual Architecture
provides autopilot and flight director modes of operation for automatic
^
and manual control of a commercial airplane during all phases of flight
[DFCR-96 80] [Bendixen 831. It includes two identical flight control
computers known as FCC-201; each FCC-201 includes two CAPS-6 (Collins
Adaptive Processing System) processors, referred to as Channels A and B.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the dual-dual redundant system
containing two FCC-201 computers, and Fig. 2 gives the organization of
each FCC-201 computer.
The flight control software is written in AED (Automated Engineer
Design), an ALGOL like language. From a functional point of view it
consists of five major parts: (a) control and navigation, (b) logic, (c)
testing and voting, (d) input/output, and (e) executive. The executive
software can be divided into two major groups, foreground and
background. The foreground tasks consist of time critical functions
such as command generation and executive monitoring. The background
programs perform non-time-critical operations like processor self-test
and memory checksum. Figure 3 describes the foreground software
structure and the timing relationship. The software consists of one
segment performing pitch rate inner loop calculations at a rate of 60
per second. After every third execution of the 60 per second segment,
the multipath software segment is restarted. This means that the
multipath segment is executed 20 times per second. The multipath
software segment contains segments which are executed at three different
rates: 20, 10, and 5 times per second. At the end of each foreground
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8execution, the executive schedules the background process.
Synchronization between the two channels is performed 20 times per
second. The software programs of the two channels are not identical,
but there is some overlap. Functions performed by each of the two
channels are shown in Table 1.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The experimental setup of the flight simulator at NASA-AMES Research
Center is shown in Fig. 4. More details can be found in [Defeo 82]. A
PDP-11/60 is used to modify the flight software (insert assertions and
errors), under the UNIX operating system. The flight software is
compiled at a different location and the compiled code is transferred to
the PDP-11/60 via a modem link. The executable code is then transferred
to the flight computers. The PDP-11/60 is then used to simulate the
airplane in real-time under the RSX operating system. Some important
parts of the experimental setup are as follows:
(a) CAPS TEST ADAPTER (CTA): Each CTA is dedicated to one processor
and allows the operator access to the associated CAPS transfer bus
directly from its front panel control or from the HP terminal. Some
of the capabilities provided by the CTAs are: (1) Display of
transfer bus address and data, (2) examine and modify any bus-
addressable location, (3) monitor the contents of a selected
address, etc.
Table 1 Flight Software Functions
CHANNELS A and B
1 PITCH AUTOLAND
2 ROLL AUTOLAND
3 YAW AUTOLAND
4 TOGA
5 ENGAGE LOGIC
6 SERVO MONITORING
7 SYNCHRONIZATION
8 INSTRUMENTATION
9 ANUNCIATION
10 YAW SAS
11 INNER LOOPS
CH. A
1 ROLL OUTER
2 ALT ALERT
3 MODE LOGIC
4 GLARESHIELD
INTERFACE
5 SENSOR
COMPARISON {
CH. B
1 PITCH OUTER
2 AUTOTHROTTLE
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(b) MODULAR DIGITAL INTERFACE CONTROL UNIT (MDICU): It is a CAPS-6
based data distributor whose primary function is the control of the
flow and format of the simulated aircraft parameters generated by
the PDP-11/60 and of the control commands generated from the flight
computers. This function enables the closed loop operation. The
HP-2645 terminal provides direct operator control over the operation
of the MDICU.
(c) PDP-11/04: The PDP-11/04 is used as an interface between the
PDP-11/60 or the HP-2645 and the FCC. The PDP-11/04 combined with
the HP-2645 can duplicate all the functions of the CTA. It can also
be used for uploading and downloading blocks of FCC memory into
internal devices and the PDP-11/60.
(d) PDP-11/60: It is the central element of the experimental setup.
It supports two distinct environments: A code-developing (static)
environment and a dynamic environment where the flight software can
be exercised in closed loop real-time. In the dynamic environment
the PDP-11/60 holds the aircraft model. The flight data is
transmitted from the PDP-11/60 to the MDICU, which converts the data
so that the flight computers can use them. The flight computers
compute control surface commands which are fed back to the flight
equations.
12
4 TESTING FLIGHT SOFTWARE
The flight software was tested in the heading select mode (change of
direction) at constant speed and constant altitude. Initial testing was
done using the setup shown in Fig. 4 at NASA-AMES Flight Software
Verification Laboratory [DeFeo 82]. The simulations for the second
phase of testing, as described in Sec. 4.2, were performed on Stanford's
DECSYSTEM-20.
Ideally the assertions should be written from the specifications.
However, since no specifications were available, extensive simulations
were performed to understand the software. The purpose was not only to
study what the programmers have written but also to find out why they
have written it. In order to limit the complexity of the problem, only
the portion of flight software which is responsible for changing the
heading (direction) of the plane was studied.
The heading is changed by rolling the plane. As long as the bank
(roll) angle is greater than zero, the plane continues to turn. The
banking (roll) of the plane itself is controlled by the ailerons on the
wings. The ailerons must be opened for the specified amount of time to
achieve the required bank angle. The longer the ailerons are kept open,
the larger the bank angle will become. The larger the bank angle, the
faster the plane turns. For correct and safe turning of the plane, the
plane must be banked to the correct angle by opening the ailerons for a
specified amount of time. When the heading error (difference of where
13
the plane is and where it should go) falls below a fixed value, the
straightening of the plane should begin by again opening the ailerons
for a specified amount of time.
The timing relationship between the relevant procedures and the data
flow from the input (selected heading) to the output (commands to the
ailerons) is shown in Fig. 5. A brief description of each of the
modules is as follows: i
(1) A_LAT_COM: This module computes heading and airspeed gain (KTAS)
for use by the HDG_SEL module.
(2) HDG_SEL: This module performs the heading select computations
using selected heading, true heading and yaw rate. It generates a
roll-attitude command (LAT_LIM_CMD) which is passed to the LAT_LIMITER
module. As long as the heading error is greater than a fixed value,
the LAT_LIM_CMD remains constant at 0.5. When the heading error
becomes less than the fixed value, the LAT_LIM_CMD becomes
proportional to it.
(3) LAT_LIMITER: This module performs magnitude and rate limiting
(where the limits depend on the airspeed) of the roll-attitude command
from the HDG_SEL module and generates LAT_CPL_CMD which is passed to
the A_LAT_COUPL module. The LAT_CPL_CMD increases at a fixed rate to
a fixed value. The rate of change and the maximum value is determined
by the airspeed. Consider the following two lines of code taken from
this module:
14
TAS HDG-SIN HDG-COS
j
_t_
A LAT COM
i
! HEADING
! KTAS
SEL_HDG YAWJtATE
i !
-LAT LIM CMD-
HDG SEL
i ii i
.i i
ii
LAT_LIMITER
5/sec
*{ A_LAT_COUPL j.
LAT CPL CMD i 20/sec i
-LAT INN CMD-
TAS
LAT INNER
20/sec
!~»»ROLL_CMD
!~»-ROLL_RATE_CMD
!-»>DELA CMD
ROLL ROLL RATE AIL POS
Fig. 5 Data Flow
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RATE_LIMIT = 0.006667 • KRTAS;
MAGJLIMIT = 0.203067 « KRTAS;
Then MAG_LIMIT/RATE_LIMIT = 30.45. As the module is executed 5 times
a second, this means that the LAT_CPL_CMD will reach its maximum value
in about 6 seconds irrespective of the airspeed. (This is an example
of the case where it is important to know the intent of the programmer
and not just the code). When LAT_LIM_CMD decreases below a fixed
i
value, the LAT_CPL_O1D becomes proportional to it.
(1) A_LAT_COUPL: This module performs coupling between the outer loop
modules and the LAT_INNER module. It generates LAT_INN_CMD which is
passed to the LAT_INNER module. The LAT_INN_CMD is just the filtered
version of the LAT_CPL_CMD.
(5) LAT_INNER: This module performs the inner loop computations for
the lateral axis. It includes roll attitude and rate feedback, lead-
lag compensation, command limiting, aileron limit override logic, etc.
The output generated by this module includes ROLL_CMD, ROLL_RATE_CMD,
and DELA_CMD (command to the ailerons). For correct and safe turning
of the plane, the DELA_CMD should achieve its maximum value between 3-
6 seconds and should return to a mean value of about zero after 9
seconds.
Waveforms of some of the important variables are shown in Fig. 6.
U.1 TESTING - PHASE ONE
Initially the assertions were inserted only in the LAT_INNER module.
Table 2 contains examples of some of those assertions. Table 3 shows a
16
SEL-HDG TIME
HEADING-ERROR
LAT_Lm_CMD
0.5
LAT_CPL_CMD
6 sees.
LAT_INN_CHD
DELA_CMD
Fig. 6 Waveforms of Some Variables
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Table 2 Initial Assertions
(a) ABS(LAT_LIM_CMD) ^ 0.5
(b) ABS(LAT_CPL_CMD) « 0.11
(c) ABS(LAT_CPL_CHG) ^ 0.003U
(d) ABS(LAT_INN_CMD) ^ 0.18333
(e) ABS(ROLL)
 x< 0.165
(f) ABS(HDG_CHG)
 N< 0.0046
(g) TIME TO CHANGE HEADING
 N<
MAXIMUM TIME
(h) HEADING ERROR DECREASES
MONOTONICALLY
Table 3 A Program Segment with an Assertion
Define Procedure LAT.INNER to be
begin
if R.TEST.COMPL
then begin
RL8 = RL8.D = DLIMITCRL8.D + RL11.D + RL11.D.S, 0.258);
RL11.D.S = RL11.D;
RL13 = LIMIT(RL7 + RL8, 0.171M29)/ 0.203333;
end
else RL13 = TEST.CMD (RAM.PTR (R.TEST.PTR));
DELA.CMD = RL13;
COMMEMT ASSERT IBS(DELA.CMP) < 0.13;
end;
18
segment of the LAT_INNER module with an assertion inserted in it. The
program is processed by a preprocessor which converts all the inserted
assertions in compiler recognizable code. It was found that only 25 %
of the errors inserted in the software were detected by these initial
assertions. The two main reasons for the low detection rate were the
inadequacy of the first set of assertions used and the nature of flight
control software.
The flight control system is very redundant in hardware and
software. Examples of the hardware redundancy are replication and
hardware limiters. The software redundancy comes from the software
limiters and from voting on the input and output. This redundancy tends
to mask errors. As an example, consider the variable LAT_LIM_CMD
(output of HDG_SEL module). Its value is limited to 0.5, as long as the
heading error is greater than a fixed value. This makes the output
independent of the input conditions. Similarily, LAT_CPL_CMD (generated
by the LATJLIMITER module) increases at a fixed rate to a fixed value.
This makes the LAT_CPL_CMD independent of the input changes. Another
aspect of flight software which makes it different from the other
software is that it contains a great number of boolean variables and
decision points. This makes it difficult to write the same kind of
assertions as were written for the other kind of more computational
intensive software. For such a computational intensive code it is easy
to use range assertions. This is not true for the flight software.
19
The inadequacy of the assertions used was the other reason for low
»
error detection. Ideally the assertions should be written during the
design phase from specifications. The lack of any specification
document made it very difficult to write good and meaningful assertions.
Some of the main flaws in the assertions used were as follows:
(a) The assertions were only placed in the last module (LAT_INNER).
It is very difficult to write such global assertions which can takei
every possible condition into consideration. The complexity of
assertions starts to approach the complexity of the program itself.
One solution is to use many simple assertions at various points in the
program. Placement of assertions is very important for good error
coverage. This has also been discussed in [Milli 81] and is confirmed
by the present study.
(b) Most assertions were based on worst case conditions. However,
many errors did not cause the worst case conditions to be exceeded.
(c) Some of the assertions only checked the maximum value. However,
in the case of some errors, the maximum value achieved by the
variables during a certain time frame was much less than the correct
value. It was not possible to check for the minimum value because the
correct minimum value of variables is zero most of the time. One
solution is to make time a parameter of assertions. Then the values
of a variable can be sampled at particular times and checked to be
within a maximum and minimum range.
20
4.2 TESTING - PHASE TWO
In order to improve the turnaround time, the relevant portions of
the software were rewritten in PASCAL and the simulation was done on
Stanford's DECSYSTEM-20. The assertions were written by using the
information . about the range or the state of variables at different
points in the program and by making use of the inverse relationships.
Most of the variables used in the assertions were either the output of
modules or the input from sensors. Assertions were placed at the output
of modules and before limiters and filters implemented in the software.
Some examples of assertions inserted in each of the modules are as
follows:
(1) HDGJSEL:
(a) IF ABS(hdg_error • tas) >, 0.02442 then ABS(lat_lim_cmd) =
0.5.
(2) LATJLIMITER:
(a) Time for lat_cpl_cmd to reach maximum lies between 5.5 and
6.5 seconds.
(b) IF ABS(lat_cpl_cmd) is decreasing then
(i) ABS(hdg_error) ^ Constant.
(ii) ABS(0.055556 • lat_cpl_cmd) = (0.155556 - 0.2222 »
krtas) * (seljidg - 0.736667*yaw_rate - hdg).
(3) A_LAT_COUPL:
(a) Maximum value of lat_inn_cmd ^ maximum possible value of
lat_cpl_cmd.
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(b) Time for lat_inn_cmd to reach maximum lies between 6 and 9
seconds.
(c) lat_inn_cmd, lat_cpl_cmd, and lat_lim_cmd must all be reset
to zero.
(4) LAT_INNER:
(a) lat_inn_cmd = 0.5 * (r!5+0.764«roll+0.1525*roll_rate).
(b) ABS(rl7) ^ 0.032. i
(c) Time for DELA_CMD to reach maximum lies between 2.5 and 6
seconds.
(d) ABS(dela_cmd) ^ 0.13.
The above assertions can be divided into three main classes, range
assertions, inverse assertions and state assertions. Examples of
assertions based on the range of variables are as follows:
(a) ABS(LAT_CPL_CMD) ^0.11.
(b) MAX. VALUE OF LAT_INN_CMD ^ MAX. POSSIBLE VALUE OF LAT_CPL_CMD.
(c) ABS(ROLL) <: 0.165.
(d) ABS(HEADING CHANGE) ^ 0.0046/sec.
(e) ABS(DELA_CMD) ^ 0.13.
Examples of assertions based on the inverse relationships are as
follows:
IF ABS(LAT_CPL_CMD) IS DECREASING THEN
(i) ABS(HEADING-ERROR) ^  CONSTANT.
(ii) ABS(0.055555 * LAT_CPL_CMD) = (0.155556 - 0.2222 « KRTAS) »
(SEL HDG-0.736667*YAW RATE-HDG).
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These assertions are based on the fact that the LAT_CPL_CMD decreases
only when the LAT_LIM_CMD (and hence the heading error) has decreased to
a specified value. At that time the LAT_CPL_CMD becomes proportional to
the LAT_LIM_CMD which is itself proportional to the heading error given
by sel_hdg-0.736667*yaw_rate-hdg.
Assertions in flight software which check the state of variables are
based on the observation that the values of variables can be divided
into three distinct regions. The first region is where the value of a
variable is increasing, the second is where the value becomes constant,
and the third is where a variable returns to its initial value. This
can also be seen in Fig. 6. For such variables the following conditions
can be checked: (a) rate of increase of variables, (b) maximum value
attained by the variable, (c) time to reach maximum value, (d) time when
the variable starts returning to its initial value, and (e) rate of
change when the variable is returning to its initial value. Examples of
assertions which check the state of variables are as follows:
(1) TIME FOR LAT_CPL_CMD TO REACH MAXIMUM LIES BETWEEN 5.5 AND 6.5
SECONDS.
(2) TIME FOR LAT_INN_CMD TO REACH MAXIMUM LIES BETWEEN 6 AND 9
SECONDS.
(3) LAT_INN_CMD, LAT_CPL_CMD, AND LATJLIM_CMD MUST ALL BE RESET TO
THEIR INITIAL VALUE.
(4) TIME FOR DELA_CMD TO REACH MAXIMUM LIES BETWEEN 2.5 AND 6
SECONDS.
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The software was seeded with errors, one at a time, and executed to
see how many of the seeded errors cause assertion violations. Error
types and frequencies were similar to those in the NASA-AMES data base
of errors. The insertion of errors was done independently from the
writing of assertions. The results of the experiment are given in Table
4. Currently, the software is only partially asserted, that is, the
current assertions only check for the errors in the software which is
i
executed during the heading select mode. It can be seen that 66 % of
all the errors inserted in the partially asserted software were
detected. Some of the reasons for undetected errors are as follows:
(a) The default value assigned to the variables by the compiler was
the same as the initial value of the variables. So the error caused
by deleting the initialization statement was not detected.
(b) In the case of some boolean statements, the final result was
independent of the value of some variables. Any error in the value of
those variables could not have been detected.
(c) Some of the errors were in a section of code which was not
executed during this phase of testing.
(d) Some errors changed the name of one boolean variable into another.
However, since the value of both variables was the same, the error was
not detected.
(e).Some errors simulated the condition of a multiple sensor failure.
Such errors could not have been detected.
24
Table 4 Preliminary Experimental Results
ERROR TYPE
DATA HANDLING
LOGIC
DATABASE
COMPUTATIONAL
TOTAL
ERRORS
INSERTED
22
19
19
21
81
% ERRORS
DETECTED
PARTIALLY
ASSERTED
63.6
47.3
78o9
76.1
66.6
FULLY
ASSERTED
90.9
84.2
94.7
80.9
87.6
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The error coverage can be increased to more than 87 % by fully
asserting the software, that is, by writing assertions for all of the
flight modes. The current assertions only check for the errors in the
software which is executed during the heading select mode. Errors in
the software which have no effect on the results are redundant.
However, these errors would be caught by a different set of assertions,
written specifically to check that particular flight mode. Currently,
i
assertions are being written for two other modes: altitude select mode
and autoland mode. It is believed that the use of these assertions
would increase the error coverage to more than 87 %. More extensive
assertion testing of flight software will provide more definitive
results.
5 LANGUAGE FEATURES
Currently assertions can only be a single logical statement. This
is very restrictive. Consider the following assertion:
IF ABS(HEADING-ERROR«TAS) > 0.024 THEN ABS(LAT_LIM_CMD) = 0 . 5
Using the current format the above assertion would be written as
ASSERT ((ABS(HEADING-ERROR«TAS) > 0.024) AND (ABS(LAT_LIM_CMD)=0.5)) OR
(ABS(HEADING-ERROR*TAS) < 0.024)
This restriction makes it difficult to write and understand
assertions. Usually assertions require extra code to be inserted. It
must be possible to write assertions which consist of procedures,
26
functions, and a sequence of statements. The presence of the following
features in programming languages greatly facilitate the use of
executable assertions:
(1) Provisions to conditionally execute an assertion, that is the
assertion is only executed if a certain condition holds.
(2) Being able to use functions, procedures, or sequence of
statements in assertions.
(3) Being able to refer to previous values of variables.
(4) Provisions for specifying the range (max., min.) of variables.
(5) Being able to check the initial and final value of variables.
(6) Provisions for conditionally compiling assertions.
The use of executable assertions has been supported in the past by
either developing new languages like EUCLID [Popek 77] or by using a
preprocessor for recognizing the assertions and converting them into
compiler recognizable code [Stucki 75]. Many languages have been
extended to support the use of executable assertions. Some of the above
mentioned features have been included in these languages. [Chow 76] and
[Taylor 80] discuss in detail some of the features needed to facilitate
the use of executable assertions. [Krieg-Bruckner 80] [Luckham 84]
describe the extension of ADA to support specifications and assertions.
Their ANNA (Annotated ADA) is the most recent language which supports
assertions. It contains many of the above mentioned features, which
make the use of assertions very easy.
SUMMARY
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Executable assertions can be used for detecting errors throughout
the lifecycle of software. They can be written using the information
provided in the specifications. Sometimes the writing of assertions is
not easy, but it can help increase the reliability of software. The use
of assertions forces programmers to explicitly write their assumptions
and goals, thereby not only providing good documentation but also
increasing their own understanding of the problem. Techniques for
writing and using assertions to test flight software were presented.
Language features to support efficient use-of assertions were also
discussed. Many examples of assertions that check the inverse
relationships, range of variables, rate of change of variables, and time
spent by variables in different states were given. The experimental
setup for testing flight software was described. Preliminary
experimental results show that assertions can detect more than 66 % of
the errors. The error coverage can be increased to more than 87 % by
using a different set of assertions for different flight modes. This
also reduces the complexity of individual assertions. In order to get
high error coverage it is important to place assertions intelligently.
Instead of using a few complex assertions many simple assertions must be
used. It must be pointed out that the use of assertions by itself does
not solve the problem of test data generation. It provides the means
for checking the output, once appropriate inputs are applied. However,
28
the use of excutable assertions combined with other testing techniques
results in a very good and efficient testing methodology.
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